# Giving to Others in the Nation: A Framed Online Field Experiment in Uttar Pradesh

Author : Monisha Dhingra[1]

July 2022

1 Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London: London School of Economics and Political Science; Centre for Social Impact and Philanthropy, Haryana: Ashoka University.

# Abstract

Increasing income inequality and nationalistic populism are key economic and political offshoots of market-based economic policies. One of the mechanisms to offset income gaps within the market-based framework is redistribution via philanthropic flows, and charitable giving. Testing the efficacy of charitable giving as a model of redistribution in the context of nationalistic populism, we pilot a framed field experiment in Lucknow (n = 285) Uttar Pradesh, to investigate the impact of nationalistic social norms on the prosocial behaviour of upper caste and OBC Hindus towards poor from Brahmin, Dalit and Muslim backgrounds. We frame a multi-recipient dictator game as a charitable giving scenario, whereby participants are exposed to either exclusive nationalistic norms (Hindutva), or inclusive nationalistic norms (The Constitution of India) and are subsequently asked to allocate INR 100 to two recipients of the same social identity randomly selected from aforementioned caste or religious backgrounds. One recipient in each pair is shown to receive empowerment-oriented help via cash transfers, and the other is shown to receive dependence-oriented help via food vouchers. While we find no significant discrimination in donations allocated to Dalits or Muslims in the control condition, we find that exposure to constitutional norms (arguably due to status threat) results in the same quantitative reduction in donations towards Muslims (as compared to the control) as does Hindutva norms. On the other hand, neither constitutional norms, nor Hindutva norms have an overall significant impact on donations made to Dalits. Lastly, we find that though there are no significant differences in donations allocated to Dalits and Muslims in the control condition, the gaps increase significantly in the two nationalism conditions, and is the largest in the exclusive nationalism condition. Results suggest that relying on market-based principles of redistribution such as charitable giving, in the context of rising nationalistic populism, can indeed exacerbate pre-existing inequalities between groups.

**Key words:** Nationalism, Prosocial Behaviour, Empowerment and Dependence Oriented Help, Charitable Giving, Social Norms, Hindutva, The Constitution of India, Caste, Religion, India.

**<u>Supervision and Contributions:</u>**

**<u>Acknowledgements:</u>**

# **Introduction**

Social scientists have increasingly acknowledged that the reliance on free-market principles in the global economy has led to wider income gaps in societies worldwide.[2] This income inequality has created a societal disjunction between the actual versus expected social mobility,[3] leading to a frustrated stagnancy in access to material[4] and status based well-being.[5] It motivates individuals to rationalise their 'individualised dissatisfaction' by endorsing ideologies that shift the blame of the brunt of social comparison and sometimes financial scarcity from the-self-to-other (for example, blaming immigrants and minorities).[6] Some of the other adverse individual-level consequences are depression,[7] psychosis,[8] and anxiety.[9] This tussle between blaming oneself as against the other for structural problems in the economy creates a catalytic

---

[2] Alvaredo, Facundo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. 2018b. World Inequality Report 2018. World Inequality Lab. http://wir2018.wid.world

[3] Robert King Merton, and Robert C. Merton. *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1968).

[4] John W. Lynch, George Davey Smith, George A. Kaplan, and James S. House. 'Income inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions.' *Bmj*, vol. 320, no. 7243 (2000): 1200-1204.

[5] Richard Layte, 'The association between income inequality and mental health: testing status anxiety, social capital, and neo-materialist explanations,' *European Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 4 (2012): 498-511.

[6] Antony SR Manstead, 'The psychology of social class: How socioeconomic status impacts thought, feelings, and behaviour,' *British Journal of Social Psychology,* vol. 57, no. 2 (2018): 267-291.; Immo Fritsche and Philipp Jugert, 'The consequences of economic threat for motivated social cognition and action,' *Current Opinion in Psychology*, vol. 18 (2017): 31-36.; Amy R. Krosch and David M. Amodio, 'Economic scarcity alters the perception of race,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 111, no. 25 (2014): 9079-9084

[7] Vikram Patel, Jonathan K. Burns, Monisha Dhingra, Leslie Tarver, Brandon A. Kohrt, and Crick Lund, 'Income inequality and depression: a systematic review and meta-analysis of the association and a scoping review of mechanisms,' *World Psychiatry*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2018): 76-89.

[8] Wagner Silva Ribeiro, Annette Bauer, Mário César Rezende Andrade, Marianna York-Smith, Pedro Mario Pan, Luca Pingani, Martin Knapp, Evandro Silva Freire Coutinho, and Sara Evans-Lacko, 'Income inequality and mental illness-related morbidity and resilience: a systematic review and meta-analysis,' *The Lancet Psychiatry*, vol. 4, no. 7 (2017): 554-562.

[9] Matthew Ridley, Gautam Rao, Frank Schilbach, and Vikram Patel, 'Poverty, depression, and anxiety: Causal evidence and mechanisms,' *Science,* vol. 370, no. 6522 (2020el/ Wilkinson).

discomfort that leads to heightened defensive identification with group identities that ameliorates the discomfort in the short term.[10] This in turn snowballs into giving psychological shape to nationalistic populism in the long term.[11]

Fundamentally, nationalistic ideas are embedded within norms pertaining to inclusion and exclusion of different coexisting social groups in a country.[12] These norms become instrumental in informing social and economic divisions. Predictably, the worst sufferers of inequality are groups at the bottom of the society, those who have been historically disadvantaged and marginalised and yet pay the price of the economic growth of mainstream society.[13] An important solution to addressing growing disparities between the mainstream and the marginalised groups is redistribution of private capital through individual choice-based mechanisms, such as philanthropic flows and charitable giving. In this context, the efficacy of charitable giving as a channel to redistribute private capital is tied to understanding how nationalistic populism may influence prosocial and redistributive behaviours towards historically marginalised groups and minorities. Keeping this question as the central focus, we look to India as a majority world setting to investigate how the existing polemic of exclusive and inclusive nationalism influence behaviours that can help empower and potentially alleviate poverty among the marginalised.

The shape of inequality in India is inherently intersectional, wherein the top 10% of Hindus from the Forward Caste and Brahmin background now own more than 60% of the entire wealth of the country, with overwhelming numbers of Muslims and Dalits at the bottom 10%.[14] This inter-group inequality exists within caste groups as well, and is in fact, highest among the upper castes, creating a catalyst for invidious social comparison, status anxiety, and perceived group-based

---

[10] Adrian Lüders, Eva Jonas, Immo Fritsche, and Dimitrij Agroskin. 'Between the lines of us and them: identity threat, anxious uncertainty, and reactive in-group affirmation: how can antisocial outcomes be prevented?', *Understanding peace and conflict through social identity theory*, (Cham: Springer, 2016): 33-53.

[11] Karim Bettache and Chi-Yue Chiu, 'The invisible hand is an ideology: Toward a social psychology of neoliberalism,' *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 75, no. 1 (2019): 8-19.

[12] C.J. Berry, Nations and norms. *The Review of Politics*, vol. 43, no. 1, 75-87.

[13] Alpa Shah, Jens Lerche, Richard Axelby, Dalel Benbabaali, Brendan Donegan, Raj Jayaseelan, and Thakur Vikramditya, *Ground down by growth: tribe, caste, class and inequality in 21st Century India*, London: Pluto Press, 2017.

[14] Nitin Kumar Bharti, 'Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1961-2012,' *WID, world Working Paper*, 14 (2018).

victimisation.[15] Among the OBC groups, the bottlenecks in access to resources due to inequality among the non-creamy layer OBCs threatens intra and inter-group group solidarity.[16]

With these socio-economic disparities at the backdrop, previous research has cast doubts on the philanthropic motivations of upper caste Hindus towards the out-group, whereby evidence shows that upper-caste Hindus are indeed more sympathetic towards victims from their own group as compared to Dalits and Muslims.[17] Historically, caste divisions and communal tensions have informed the diameter of perspective-taking and interpersonal and social exchange among individuals and communities in India. However, social norms pertaining to shared ideas of India have moderated these dimensions – influencing the magnitude of group cooperation and conflict.[18] To this end, while income inequality may be seen as resulting from systemic and structural processes pertaining to economic policies; social representations such as ideas of nationhood – that shape cooperation, resource sharing, institutional behaviours, and support for social policies – may reciprocally be instrumental in perpetuating or challenging the same.

From its very origins, India as a pluralistic democracy has been a confluence of multiple ideologies that normatively shape the paradigm of self-other relationships among individuals and groups.[19] The inclusive idea of India grounded in the Indian Constitution has foundationally attempted to bridge caste and religious cleavages through the cement of values such as equality, justice, and fraternity.[20] This idea has fought several communal and cultural battles in practice, yet its basic structure stands unaltered.[21] Besides laying a foundation for building inclusive institutions, previous research shows that salience of common national identity via national symbols such as the tricolour map of India can reduce discrimination towards Muslims and multiply the magnitude

[15] Jean Drèze, 'The Revolt of the Upper Caste .' *CASTE/A Global Journal on Social Exclusion*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2020): 229-236.

[16] Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election–Why Have So Many Poor Started Voting for Modi?' *Studies in Indian Politics*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019): 149-160.

[17] Ashwini Deshpande and Dean Spears, 'Who is the identifiable victim? Caste and charitable giving in modern India,' *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2016): 299-321.

[18] Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, 'Bunch of thoughts,' (Bangalore : Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, : 1996).

[19] Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma, *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[20] B.R. Ambedkar, *Constitution of India*. Vol. 1. (India: Soft Group, 2014).

[21] Sudhir Krishnaswamy, *Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

of charitable contributions towards the latter.[22] This is consonant with previous research, which shows that social and psychological re-construal of institutional and national identities based on common superordinate principles carries the potential for enhancing inter-group solidarity, perspective taking, resource sharing, and co-operation.[23] To this end, one would expect constitutional norms to abet prosocial behaviour towards minorities and disadvantaged groups.

Contrarily, constructions of common group identities can potentially be threatening if they don't recognise sub-group identities, and especially so for majority groups.[24]Since norms embedded in the Indian Constitution are foundationally grounded in the principles of secularism, principally these norms acknowledge the Hindu cultural identity.[25] However, given the polemic around the idea of secularism embedded in the Constitution of India,[26] whether these principles are in fact able to ameliorate and pre-empt the potential identity based threat that may be experienced by Hindus is yet debatable. Additionally, another unintended effect of salience of equality and fairness-based narratives is status threat experienced by dominant groups due to potential loss of privilege.[27] For example, research shows that support for right-wing populism in the US is driven by status threat experienced by white Americans.[28] Interestingly, in the context of affirmative action, experiments show that white Americans are more likely to display threat response when they learnt that a job interview valued diversity, as against when no diversity messages were

---

[22] Volha Charnysh, Christopher Lucas, and Prerna Singh, 'The ties that bind: National identity salience and prosocial behaviour toward the ethnic other,' *Comparative Political Studies,* vol. 48, no. 3 (2015): 267-300.

[23] J.F. Dovidio, S.L. Gaertner, N. Schnabel, T. Saguy and J. Johnson, 'Recategorization and prosocial behaviour,' *The Psychology of Prosocial Behaviour: Group processes, inter-group relations, and helping*, (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2010): 289-309.; R.M. Kramer and M.B. Brewer, 'Does a common in-group identity reduce inter-group threat? Group Processes & Inter-group Relations,' vol. 13, no. 4: 403–423.; Matthew S. Levendusky, 'Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarisation?' *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 80, no. 1 (2018): 59-70.

[24] John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy, 'Another view of "we": Majority and minority group perspectives on a common in-group identity,' *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2008): 296-330.

[25] Rochana Bajpai, 'The conceptual vocabularies of secularism and minority rights in India,' *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002): 179-198; Christophe Jaffrelot, 'The fate of secularism in India,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2019). https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/fate-of-secularism-in-india-pub-78689

[26] J. Sai Deepak, *India that is Bharat: Coloniality, Civilisation, Constitution,* (USA: Bloomsbury, 2021).

[27] D. Scheepers, N. Ellemers and N. Sintemaartensdijk, 'Suffering from the possibility of status loss: Physiological indicators of social identity threat in high status groups,' *European Journal of Social Psychology*, vo. 39, (2009): 1075–1092.

[28] Diana C. Mutz, 'Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330-E4339.

communicated.[29] In the Indian context, with increasing income inequality within upper caste groups, nationalistic narratives prescribing the importance of inter-group equality, can arguably be construed as a threat by the dominant upper caste groups, and thus lead to defensive behaviour towards minority and disadvantaged groups, consequently reducing pro-social behaviour.

Research on inter-group helping relations by Nadler et al.[30] shows that perceived stability of inter-group hierarchy may inform the kind of help offered by individuals from different social groups. Individuals from high status groups maintain positive differentiation and prevent any imminent threat to their status and position by offering dependence-oriented help. This form of help is premised on the idea that the recipient who is unable to solve their own problem, is perhaps incompetent, and in some ways needs to be dependent on the provider. This help can thus reinforce the relative power and status of the provider.

In this sense, dependence-oriented help is viewed as a means by which inequality is maintained. On the other hand, empowerment-oriented help is a mechanism by which inequality is challenged.[31] The latter is based on the assumption that the recipient is capable of being independent and making sound decisions, however needs some assistance in doing so.[32] Help is provided to empower the recipient, so that they can execute a task autonomously without needing the provider. Importantly, these two forms of help have been shown to have differential consequences on independence, self-reliance, and the personal power of the receiver[33] Interestingly, an extension of Nadler et al.'s experimental paradigm also shows that common in-group identity can overcome status threat, and motivate individuals to offer empowerment or

---

[29] T.L. Dover, B. Major and C.R. Kaiser, 'Members of high-status groups are threatened by organizational diversity messages,' *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 62, (2016): 58–67.

[30] Samer Halabi and Arie Nadler, 'The inter-group status as helping relations model: Giving, seeking and receiving help as tools to maintain or challenge social inequality,' *Intergroup helping*, (Cham: Springer, 2017): 205-221).

[31] S. Halabi, J.F. Dovidio and A. Nadler, 'When and how do high status group members offer help: Effects of social dominance orientation and status threat', *Political Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 6 (2008): 841-858.

[32] Arie Nadler and Samer Halabi, 'Helping relations and inequality between individuals and groups,' *APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Volume 2: Group processes*, American Psychological Association, (2015): 371-393.

[33] Katherina Alvarez, Esther van Leeuwen, Esteban Montenegro-Montenegro, and Mark van Vugt, 'Empowering the poor: A field study of the social psychological consequences of receiving autonomy or dependency aid in Panama,' *British Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 57, no. 2 (2018): 327-345.

autonomy-oriented donations towards disadvantaged groups.[34] However, it remains an open question as to whether inclusive Indian identity performs this palliative function for the status threat that may be experienced by upper caste Hindus.

On the other hand, the imagination of India has also historically been understood as co-constituted by the cultural and political projection of Hindu cultural identity as national identity.[35] Hindutva ideology has been argued to be rooted in Hindu insecurity of being ruled by "foreigners".[36] It is a crude pejorative frequently invoked to lump together the Islamic rulers with the British empire, both of whom once controlled large swathes of present-day India. This insecurity feeds the need for identity-based differentiation as well as the restoration of pride in one's culture.[37] These exclusive, that is, 'excluding' sentiments inform and explain the political demand for a 'Hindu Rashtra' – 'rashtra' meaning empire or nation. This rashtra, then, becomes constitutive of symbolic and affective identity-based norms and representations that influence inter-group relations and politics in contemporary Indian society.[38] Since within-group income inequality puts a proportion of Hindus from the upper caste and OBC backgrounds at the sharp end of the status hierarchy,[39] the resultant feeling of status threat and inferiority provides a stronger hold to exclusive nationalistic sentiments, such as Hindutva ideology.[40] This carries the risk of reinforcing prejudice against Muslims, and perceived status inferiority of Dalits.

A second aspect of heightened in-group identification among Hindus may be perceived common-in group identity premised on Hinduism, which attempts to unite all caste groups within the Hindu

---

[34] Arie Nadler, Gal Harpaz-Gorodeisky and Yael Ben-David, 'Defensive helping: Threat to group identity, in-group identification, status stability, and common group identity as determinants of inter-group help-giving,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 97, no. 5 (2009): 823.

[35] Christophe Jaffrelot, *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2021).

[36] Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[37] Shashi Tharoor, 'Who is an Indian?' *SAIS Review (1989-2003)*, (2000): 103-105.

[38] Angana P. Chatterji, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism is Changing India*, (Oxford University Press, 2019).

[39] Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election–Why Have So Many Poor Started Voting for Modi?, *Studies in Indian Politics*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019): 149-160.

[40] *See also:* Edward Anderson and Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Hindu nationalism and the "saffronisation of the public sphere": An interview with Christophe Jaffrelot,' *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 26, no. 4 (2018): 468-482.

fold.[41] This means that people from disadvantaged castes may be viewed by upper caste Hindus as an undeniable part of the Hindu in-group. Such a view that may increase cooperation among the upper caste and the disadvantaged castes, hence motivating upper caste Hindus to be more prosocial towards Dalits. A caveat here is that research shows that common in-group identities premised on the identity of the dominant group can perceptually obfuscate historical disadvantages experienced by the subordinate group, while justifying the position of the advantaged groups in the hierarchy.[42]That is, a common Hindu identity can potentially harmonise the caste factions, alleviate the status threat experienced by the upper caste Hindus, enhance belongingness among the excluded caste groups, but also, simultaneously reinforce the perceived inferiority of the latter. This is further corroborated by research, which reveals that upper caste Hindus are normatively encouraged to give alms to the poor and the needy from disadvantaged castes. Such a construction of a common Hindu identity could increase dependence-oriented donations towards Dalits and, to that end, elevate the risk of reinforcing a benevolent form of casteism.[43] Consequently, norms pertaining to Hindu nationalism may create an affordance for positive self-regard and motivate charitable donations towards Dalits.

Presently, according to a recent report by Pew Research Centre[44], most Indians believe that tolerance and respect are an important part of Indian ethos, while showing simultaneous support for the idea that Hindu identity is indeed an important part of national identity. Importantly, in the second half of the last decade, political scientists and public intellectuals have increasingly drawn attention towards an evolving polemic between inclusive and exclusive narratives that shapes national identity in India.[45] Given this context, the key questions that the present research seeks to

---

[41] Sammyh S. Khan, Ted Svensson, Yashpal A. Jogdand, and James H. Liu, 'Lessons from the past for the future: The definition and mobilization of Hindu nationhood by the Hindu nationalist movement of India,' *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017): 477-511.

[42] Elze G. Ufkes, Justine Calcagno, Demis E. Glasford, and John F. Dovidio, 'Understanding how common in-group identity undermines collective action among disadvantaged-group members,' *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 63 (2016): 26-35.; Cikara, M., & Paluck, E. L. (2013). When going along gets you nowhere and the upside of conflict behaviors. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *7*(8), 559-571.

[43] B. Dardenne, M. Dumont, and T. Bollier, 'Insidious dangers of benevolent sexism: consequences for women's performance,' *Journal of personality and social psychology*, vol. 93, no. 5 (2007): 764.

[44] Jonathan Evans, and Neha Sehgal. 'Religions in India,' (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Centre, 2021). https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/29/key-findings-about-religion-in-india/ accessed on??

[45] Shashi Tharoor, *The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism and what it means to be Indian*, (Kindle: Aleph Book Company, 2020).; Christophe Jaffrelot, 'The fate of secularism in India,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2019.

address are: can norms prescribed by the Indian Constitution generate and support a common Indian identity, and motivate upper caste and OBC Hindus to share and donate resources to support the development and growth of Muslims and Dalits? Second, are norms of Hindu nationalism indeed exclusive? Do they thwart prosocial behaviour and resource sharing among towards Muslims and Dalits? Since variations of both of these norms are rife in the public sphere, mapping the impact of these norms allows us to foundationally understand the landscape of inter-group resource sharing, cooperation and charitable giving in India.

Our study attempts to address this burden via a framed field experiment: Participants are randomly assigned to read a historical social norm underlying either Hindu nationalism or The Constitution of India as against a control. Following this, we test the impact of the norm on prosocial behaviour via a multi-recipient dictator game task. In this task, participants are given a bonus of INR 100 and are asked to divide the money between themselves and two charity recipients from either Muslim, Dalit or Brahmin backgrounds. This constitutes a between-group (3 X 3) factorial design. Through a within-group variation, we test support for empowerment and dependence-oriented donations, whereby one recipient is shown as receiving help from an organisation providing food vouchers and household items (dependence-oriented help), and the other recipient is shown as receiving cash transfers, adult education, and rights-based awareness (empowerment-oriented or redistributive help). We view this experiment design, and subsequent results as informative towards building a large-scale multi-sided study quantifying mechanisms leading to heightened wealth gaps and polarisation, and thus means to curb the same.

## <u>Hypotheses</u>

Aligning the theoretically validated arguments presented above, we propose ***four hypotheses*** to predict how constitutional and Hindutva norms affect donations towards Dalit, Muslim, and Brahmin charity recipients in empowerment and dependence-oriented domains. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are competing hypotheses attempting to explain the impact of inclusive nationalism on prosocial behaviour. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are competing hypotheses attempting to

11

explain how exclusive nationalism may impact prosocial behaviour differently towards Muslim, Dalit, and Brahmin recipients.

**Common national identity hypotheses:**

The salience of constitutional norms would encourage empowerment-oriented donations towards Dalits and Muslims, compared to the control and Hindutva norms.

If this hypothesis stands true, we can expect:

1.1) An increase in overall donations towards Dalit and Muslim poor compared to the control and exclusive nationalism condition;

1.2) A reduction of monetary gap in donations made to the Brahmin, Muslim and Dalit poor, compared to exclusive nationalism condition and the control;

1.3) Higher donations in the empowerment-oriented domain than the dependence-oriented domain towards Muslim, Dalit and Brahmin recipients; and

1.4) A reduction in the monetary gap in empowerment-oriented donations towards Muslim, Dalits, and Brahmin recipients compared to the control and exclusive nationalism condition.

**Status threat hypotheses:**

The salience of constitutional norms would generate status threat among upper-caste Hindus and encourage greater dependence-oriented donations towards Dalits and Muslims.

If this hypothesis stands true, then we can expect:

2.1) A reduction in total donations towards Dalits and Muslims compared to the control.

2.2) An increase in the monetary gap in total donations made to the Brahmin, Muslim and Dalit poor, relative to exclusive nationalism condition and the control.

2.3) Higher donations in the dependence-oriented domains than the empowerment-oriented domains towards Muslim and Dalit recipients.

2.4) An increase in monetary gap in empowerment-oriented donations towards Muslim, Dalits and Brahmin recipients compared to the control and exclusive nationalism condition.

12

**Exclusive identity hypotheses:**

The salience of Hindutva norms would increase prejudice towards Dalits and Muslims and discourage charitable donations towards Dalits and Muslims.

If this hypothesis stands true, then we can expect:

3.1) A reduction in overall donations towards Dalits and Muslims compared to the control.

3.2) Increase in overall donations towards Brahmins.

3.3) Reduction in overall dependence and empowerment-oriented donations towards Muslim and Dalit charity recipients.

3.4) An increase in the monetary gap in donations made to the Brahmin, Muslim and Dalit poor, relative to donations made in the control.

3.5) An increase in the monetary gap in donations made to Brahmin, Muslim and Dalit poor in dependence and empowerment-oriented domains.

**Social harmony hypotheses:**

The salience of Hindutva norms would generate a common Hindu identity emphasising on the unity of all caste groups within the Hindu fold, which would serve to increase prosocial behaviour towards Brahmins and Dalits.

If this hypothesis were true, then we can expect:

4.1) There would be an increase in total donations towards Dalit and Brahmin charity recipients.

4.2) A reduction in monetary gap in donations made to Brahmin and Dalits in the exclusive nationalism condition.

4.3) Higher donation allocation towards dependence-oriented domain, as compared to empowerment-oriented domain towards Dalits.

4.4) Higher donation allocation towards empowerment-oriented domains than dependence-oriented domains towards Brahmins.

4.5) An increase in monetary gap in empowerment-oriented donations towards Dalit and Brahmin recipients compared to the control.

4.6) A reduction in monetary gap in dependence-oriented donations towards Dalit and Brahmin recipients compared to the control.

# Methodology

## Recruitment and Sample Characteristics:

We conduct the experiment with 285 Hindu participants residing in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. This sample is recruited through an agency with a panel of participants in Lucknow[46]. We had planned to purposively recruit Forward caste and Brahmin participants. In keeping with principles of participant anonymity, and in an attempt to prevent priming participant social identity in the recruitment process and thus purposive bias in selection, we chose to select participants pre-registered as Hindu and Upper Caste. However, this pre-selection could not prevent the recruitment of participants from Other Backward Class, Scheduled Caste, and Scheduled Tribe Backgrounds. Given the limited sample size of the pilot, instead of removing the 98 OBC, 17 SC, and 2 ST observations from the study, we decided to expand the study's conceptual framework to include OBC participants in the analysis. The detailed demographic characteristics of the sample and its break-up by Treatment and Control conditions are reported in Table 1.

Procedurally, we use mobile surveys developed on the Qualtrics Survey Platform to conduct the survey experiment. Recruiters contact each participant over a phone call to determine their interest and availability. Once they confirm their willingness, the survey link is sent to them by WhatsApp/ Text Message on a prespecified time. Participants are asked to locate themselves in a private space while taking the survey.[47] To ensure limited distractions, participants are instructed to contact the

---

[46] For a list of areas in Lucknow from which participants are recruited, please refer to Appendix A.

[47] No information about the study content and specific instructions about the experiment was shared with either the enumerators or the participants before receiving the survey. In keeping with Ashoka University Institutional Review Board guidelines, the study purpose pertaining to decision making and charitable organisations is made clear in the consent form at the beginning of the survey, and participants are given the option to opt out. Participants are assured anonymity and are guaranteed that their responses will be kept private.

enumerator after receiving and finishing the survey and indicate a start and end time. Each survey link contains a detailed consent form, instructions to engage in the survey experiment, primes, an incentivised dictator game, secondary outcome variables, mechanisms and a demographic information form. The survey is written entirely in Hindi.

**Table 1: Sample Characteristics Across Treatment Conditions**

| Variables | T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | T5 | T6 | C1 | C2 | C3 | Sample |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Number of Participants** | 30 | 35 | 30 | 32 | 28 | 33 | 32 | 29 | 35 | 285 |
| **Average age** | 31.9 | 31.9 | 31.7 | 27.6 | 31.45 | 29.75 | 31 | 30.75 | 33 | 31 |
| **Gender** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 17 | 25 | 19 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 18 | 15 | 24 | 183 |
| Female | 12 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 10 | 95 |
| Transgender | 1 | 0 | 2 | | | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 6 |
| **Caste** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brahmin | 9 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 20 | 106 |
| Forward Caste | 13 | 8 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 69 |
| SC | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 17 |
| ST | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | 2 |
| OBC | 7 | 11 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 4 | 11 | 6 | 7 | 89 |
| **Education** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than grade 12 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 57 |
| Vocational Education | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 27 |
| Graduation | 17 | 15 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 15 | 126 |
| Post-Graduation | 6 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 54 |
| **Income** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 1L | 14 | 16 | 14 | 20 | 10 | 17 | 12 | 18 | 12 | 133 |
| 1 to 2.5L | 9 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 12 | 61 |
| 2.5 to 5 L | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 8 | 59 |
| 5 to 7.5L | | 1 | 2 | | 4 | 2 | 3 | | | 10 |
| 7.5 to 10 L | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | | | | 8 |
| 10 lakhs + | | | | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 12 |

**Treatments:**

The experiment is organised as 3 (inclusive nationalism, exclusive nationalism, control) X 3 (Dalit, Muslim, Brahmin) between-group factorial design. Each participant is first exposed to either constitutional, or Hindutva norms as against the control. This is followed by a multi-recipient dictator game, where participants are paired with two recipients from either Brahmin, Muslim or Dalit background. Thus, participants are exposed to two levels of independent variables: first, a form of nationalism against the control, and second, the social identity of the charity recipient. Thus, collectively constituting 9 experimental conditions – 6 treatments and 3 controls (displayed in Table 2). This is followed by a within-group variation, whereby one of the recipients is shown as receiving help from an NGO offering empowerment-oriented help, and the second is shown as receiving help from an NGO offering dependence-oriented help. Each participant received a show-up fee of INR 150, followed by a bonus of INR 100, which they could keep or allocate to the recipients in the dictator game task.

**Table 2: Schematic representation of experimental conditions and control**

| Charity Recipients | Inclusive Nationalism | Exclusive Nationalism | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Dalit** | T1 = 30 | T4 = 32 | C1 = 32 |
| **Muslim** | T2 = 35 | T5 = 28 | C2 = 29 |
| **Brahmin** | T3= 30 | T6 = 33 | C3 = 35 |

## Experimental Primes:

Following previous research on social identity and social norms, participants are primed via a two-step process.[48] First, to make national identity salient, participants are asked to report whether they consider themselves to be a true Indian. This question is followed by a three-point scale skewed towards the positive side, whereby participants could only report the strength with which they believe that they are truly Indian. This increases salience of national identity, and ensures that participants are primed to think about the superordinate Indian identity as they engage with group-relevant norms. Subsequently, participants are asked to read an injunctive historical norm that communicated a historical idea of Indian-ness.

We vary the content of this norm based on the treatment condition. In the case of inclusive nationalism condition, we expose participants to a pre-existing norm that prescribed constitutional values as a normative ideal held historically by others in India. In the case of exclusive nationalism condition, we exposed participants to pre-existing norms that prescribed ancient Hindu culture, and Hindu unity as a normative ideal. Detailed descriptions of these norms are attached in Appendix B. Immediately after the normative communication prime, we engage participants in 'a reference-to-context-question' where we ask them to select values from a drop-down list that are deemed to be historically an important normative value in India. In the control condition, participants are asked to read information about properties of metals as solid substances, and are subsequently engaged in a short question about properties of metals.

---

[48] Michael A. Hogg, Scott A. Reid, 'Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms', *Communication Theory*, volume 16, no. 1, (February 2006): 7–30.

## 4.4 Multi-recipient Dictator Game:

After being exposed to the primes, participants are told that they will be engaging in a short decision task where they will be paired with two charity recipients from either Dalit, Muslim or Brahmin background. We use Dalit, Brahmin, and Muslim surnames,[49] along with geographical location to make recipient social identity salient. Through this decision task, we engage participants in a multi-recipient dictator game framed as a charitable giving scenario.[50]

Participants are informed that they are allocated a bonus of INR 100 over and above their participation fee and that they can choose to divide the same among the two recipients (receiving support from the two different organisations) or keep as much amount as they wish with themselves. The two recipients were shown as independently receiving support from two NGOs that partially depend on charitable, and philanthropic funds for carrying out their operations. The first organisation is characterised as providing food vouchers and household items to help the poor in meeting their needs, and the second organisation is characterised as providing cash transfers, in addition to adult education and rights education.

The former is understood as contributing towards a need, without adding to the long-term gains or rights of the recipient and can be categorised as dependence-oriented help. The latter is oriented towards meeting needs, and rights, and ensuring social and economic empowerment of the recipient and can be categorised as empowerment-oriented help[51,52]. The two identifiable

---

[49] Dalit recipients were called Nathu Valmiki and Ramesh Chamar, living in Harjan Basti and Ambedkar Nagar respectively. The brahmin recipients were called Himanshu Mishra (Varanasi), and Suresh Jha (Ayodhya), and Muslim Recipients were called Irman Kasif (Muzzafarnagar) and Salim Mohammad (Muslim Basti). These names were carefully selected based on previous research[#,#], and a newspaper article[#], so as to ensure that the surnames indicated caste and religious background. A detailed description of the charity recipients, and the instructions for the dictator game is attached in the Appendix.

[50] Dictator game is a decision-making scenario where the participant is paired with another person, he/she is given a monetary endowment and is asked whether they would share it with this person, and if so, how they would divide the endowment. The decision to share or not is entirely left up to the participant. Participants are informed that there is no right or wrong way to divide the bonus. The recipient has no actual role in the game except for receiving the money[#].

[51] Katherina Alvarez, et al. 'Empowering the poor: A field study of the social psychological consequences of receiving autonomy or dependency aid in Panama,' (2018).

[52] Samer Halabi and Arie Nadler, 'The inter-group status as helping relations model: Giving, seeking and receiving help as tools to maintain or challenge social inequality,' *Inter-group helping*, (Cham: Springer, 2017): 205-221.

18

recipients were identical in terms of their financial deprivation, work, health conditions and family situation. The key difference is in the kind of help that was provided to them. Importantly, as participants read these instructions, based on the treatment condition, they are simultaneously exposed to either a tricolour map of India (inclusive nationalism), or a saffron map of India (exclusive nationalism). All donations made by participants out of the INR 100 allocated to them are being made to Indus Action and Roshni Foundation. Detailed description of instructions for the dictator game and charity recipients is attached in Appendix C.

## **Results and Discussion**

Figure (1) and Table (3) present average combined donations (to both the recipients) in the multi-recipient dictator game across treatment conditions. Figure (2) and Table (4) present a break-up of dependence and empowerment-oriented donations towards Dalit, Muslim and Brahmin charity recipients in inclusive and exclusive nationalism groups and the control group. Using a Wald (F) Test, we compared donations towards Muslim recipients across treatment conditions and the control; we ran a similar analysis for Brahmin and Dalit charity recipients. This analysis did not reveal a statistically significant difference in donations.

Table (D.2) attached in Appendix D presents a statistical summary of this test. In the second level of analysis, we conduct Wald (F) Tests to compare the difference in donations between social groups i.e., the average difference between donations to Brahmin, Muslim, and Dalit recipients in different treatment conditions. This analysis can reveal the significance in variations in average donations made to a social group. The results are reported in the sections below. Following this, we conducted a within-group analysis to understand how donations towards empowerment and dependence-oriented domains vary for recipients from a social group.

Finally, we performed a regression analysis to understand the causal impact of nationalism on charitable donations towards different social groups, controlling for individual-level attributes such as caste, income, gender, and education. These results are presented at the end of this section.

19

To account for the impact of heterogeneity in participant caste identity in the sample on our results, we first attempted to descriptively understand the demographic distributions across treatment conditions, so as to preliminarily understand the possibility of any skew. Subsequently, we follow up each step of the analysis by stratifying it with participant social identity. Due to space constraints, the details of both these analyses are presented in Appendix E.

**Figure 1: Average total donations to Dalit, Muslim and Brahmin charity recipients across treatment conditions**

**Table 3: Average donations to Dalit, Brahmin, and Muslim charity recipient across treatment conditions**

| Recipient Social Identity | Inclusive Nationalism | Exclusive Nationalism | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Dalit** | 71.6 (26.63) N = 30 | 79.8 (25.1) N = 29 | 73.125 (29.9) N = 35 |
| **Muslim** | 57.2 (29.92) N = 36 | 57.6 (38.69) N = 34 | 66.7 (28.08) N = 30 |
| **Brahmin** | 83.3 (19.98) N = 33 | 83.1 (21.64) N = 30 | 77.7 (25.9) N = 35 |

*Note:* T = Treatment indicator, C = Control, INR Average donations, N = Sample size, (standard deviation in parentheses)

**Figure 2: Average donations in empowerment and dependence-oriented domains across treatment conditions and control**

**Table 4: Average donations in dependence and empowerment-oriented domains to Dalit, Brahmin and Muslim charity recipients across treatment conditions and control**

| | Dalit Dependence Donations | Dalit Empowerment Donations | Muslim Dependence Donations | Muslim Empowerment Donations | Brahmin Dependence Donations | Brahmin Empowerment Donations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Inclusive Nationalism** | 36 (19.3) | 35.66 (19.4) | 27.7 (18.68) | 29.4 (16.5) | 45.6 (21.107) | 36.6 (18.002) |
| **Exclusive Nationalism** | 44.39 (17.2) | 35.45 (21.4) | 26.9 (21.5) | 30.6 (21.07) | 44.52 (21.1) | 38.58 (18.02) |
| **Control** | 41.3 (17.21) | 31.96 (21.9) | 32 (22.68) | 34.667 (17.71) | 41.7 (17.8) | 36 (15.98) |

*Note*: Standard deviation in parentheses.

## Donations towards Muslims and Brahmins: Evidence for status threat and exclusive identity hypotheses

First, let us look at average combined donations,[53] made to Brahmin and Muslim charity recipients across treatment conditions. Average donations made to Brahmin and Muslim participants in the control condition are INR 77.7 (SD = 19.98, N = 35) and INR 66.7 (SD = 28.08, N = 30), a Wald F test shows that this difference is approaching marginal significance (F = 2.57; p-value = 0.11). In exclusive nationalism condition, donations to Muslim recipients reduce to INR 57.6 (SD = 38.69, N = 34), and donations to Brahmin recipients increase to INR 83.1 (SD = 21.64, N = 30), this difference is significant at 1 % level (F = 13.46; p-value = 0.003). In the inclusive nationalism condition, donations made to Muslim and Brahmin charity recipients remain more or less the same at INR 57.2 (SD = 29.9, N = 33), and INR 83.3(SD = 19.98, N = 36) respectively, significant at 1 % level (F = 13.03; p-value = 0.0003)[54].

---

[53] A sum of donations made to the two recipients in the multi-recipient dictator game (as defined above).

[54] A test of these differences conducted on observations from the upper caste Hindu participants, excluding OBC participants from the analysis, showed consistent results. Please refer to table D.4 in Appendix D for a statistical summary of this test.

Interestingly, we find that the difference in total donations is largely accounted for by gaps in donations in dependence-oriented domain. In inclusive nationalism condition, Brahmins and Muslim recipients on an average receive INR 45.66 (SD = 21.10)[55] and INR 27.7 (SD = 21.5), significant at 1% level (F = 12.26; p-value = 0.0005). In exclusive nationalism condition, Brahmins receive INR 44.52 (SD = 21.1), and Muslims receive INR 26.9 (SD = 18.68) respectively, significant at 1% level (F = 11.40; p-value = 0.0008). The gap was smaller in control condition – INR 41.7 (SD = 17.8) for Brahmin recipients and INR 32 (SD = 22.68) for Muslim recipients respectively, marginally significant at 10% level (F = 3.57; p-value = 0.057). On the contrary, there were no significant gaps in donations towards empowerment-oriented domain in inclusive nationalism and control conditions. However, in exclusive nationalism conditions, Brahmin recipients on an average receive INR 38.58 (SD = 18.02) and Muslim recipients receive INR 34.67 (SD = 17.1) – significant at 10% level (F stat = 2.92; p-value = 0.08).

The increase in gap in overall donations, as well as dependence and empowerment-oriented donations towards Brahmin and Muslim recipients in exclusive nationalism condition, is indicative of increase in prejudice towards Muslims. This confirms predictions (3.4) and (3.5) of exclusive national identity hypotheses, whereby we had argued that salience of Hindutva norms can lead to increase in gaps in donations towards Brahmin and Muslim recipients in both empowerment and dependence-oriented domains. Previous research shows that though in-group love, attachment, and identification is not equivalent to out-group discrimination and hostility,[56] the very factors that sometimes enhance group attachment also act as a fertile ground for heightened prejudice towards the out-group.[57]

In the case of the present research, group loyalty-based norms underlying Hindutva seem to increase the gap in donations allocated to Brahmin and Muslim recipients, whereby Brahmin recipients are allocated INR 5.6 more, and Muslim recipients are allocated INR 9.1 less in

---

[55] The sample size remains the same as in the total donations specified in the paragraph above and hence isn't restated here.

[56] Klaus Abbink and Donna Harris, 'In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups,' *PloS One* 14, no. 9 (2019): e0221616.

[57] Marilynn B. Brewer, 'The psychology of prejudice: In-group love or out-group hate?' *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 55 (1999): 429-444.

exclusive nationalism condition (as compared to control). Thus, showing that Hindutva norms can heighten in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice. This finding is consonant with heightened anti-Muslim sentiment in Hindutva discourse in states like Uttar Pradesh[58] and Karnataka[59]. On the upside, given that we do not find statistically significant discrimination in the control condition, it can be argued that Hindu nationalism has not yet transformed into an internalised set of norms; rather, it is constitutive of a flexible and changeable set of social representations that can be countered via appropriate communication strategies.

The increase in the gap in donations in inclusive nationalism condition is consonant with previous research, which shows that the salience of equality and fairness-based norms can potentially cue status threat among dominant groups[60], which in the case of present research manifests as lower charitable aid allocated to help the Muslim poor, and higher dependence-oriented donations provided to Brahmin recipients.[61] This arguably can be considered as evidence consonant with prediction (2.2) of status threat hypotheses, where we had argued that salience of constitutional norms would enhance status threat and increase the gap in donations made to Brahmin and Muslim recipients. Importantly, the majority of our subject pool are people earning less than 5 lakhs a year, from upper caste Hindu or OBC background. To this end, scarcity of goods, the precarity of opportunities pertaining to social mobility, and the resultant sense of comparative anxiety, may be a common underlying process that motivates groups to align themselves with Hindutva ideology (premised on in-group pride), and aver from constitutional norms.

---

[58] Geeta Pandey, 'Uttar Pradesh Elections, We Muslims are treated like sacrificial goats.' BBC News, 12 April 2022, ttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60544034 last accessed on: 15 June 2022

[59] Scroll Staff, 'Karnataka: Student wearing Hijab heckled, allegedly by ABVP members,' *Scroll*, 12 April 2022, https://scroll.in/latest/1018793/karnataka-student-wearing-hijab-heckled-allegedly-by-abvp-members, last accessed on: 15 June 2022

[60] D. Scheepers, C. Röell, and N. Ellemers, 'Unstable power threatens the powerful and challenges the powerless: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of motivation,' *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 6, no. 720 (2015),

[61] A paired t test (discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section) revealed the Brahmins receive greater dependence as against empowerment- oriented help in inclusive nationalism condition, arguably indicating defensive help towards the in-group due to exposure to norms prescribing inter-group equality. Importantly, a paired-t-test of within group differences in empowerment- and dependence-oriented domains allocated to Muslim charity recipients revealed no significant difference. Table 1.4 attached in the Appendix displays a statistical summary of this test.

Borrowing Nadler's framework, through prediction (2.4) under status threat hypotheses, we had argued that the gap in donations between Brahmin and Muslim recipients would be higher in empowerment-oriented domain as against dependence-oriented domain. However, results show that the gaps in dependence-oriented domains are larger (and statistically significant) as compared to empowerment-oriented domains across nationalism and control condition. The unexpected direction of results with respect to the nature of help offered towards Muslim recipients requires us to pay close attention to the political context of Hindu-Muslim relations in India, whereby narratives of ongoing polarisation are dotted with imagined threats of rising population of Muslim minority and the historical plunder of India.[62] Researchers have also argued that the Hindutva narrative takes off from an experience of collective victimisation due to historical Muslim invasions, and British colonisation.[63] Additionally, constitutional secularism and assertion for equality is often discursively perceived as a threat to Hindu identity, and as an attempt to engage in favouritism towards minorities.[64][65] In this context, instead of being motivated by reinforcing Hindu superiority by offering dependence oriented help, lower dependence-oriented help offered to Muslim poor may be indicative of heightened inter-group conflict.

## Donations towards Dalits and Brahmins: Social Harmony and Status Threat?

As against evidence for discrimination towards Muslims, Wald(F) Tests comparing total donations made to Brahmin and Dalit charity recipients across treatment conditions did not reveal any statistically significant effects.[66] That is, preliminarily, we did not detect any significant discrimination in how participants allocated their endowment to Dalit charity recipients.[67]

---

[62] Christophe Jaffrelot, *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2021).

[63] Eviane Leidig, 'Hindutva as a variant of right-wing extremism,' *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 54, no. 3 (2020): 215-237.

[64] J. Sai Deepak, 'India that is Bharat: Coloniality, Civilization, Constitution,' (USA: Bloomsbury, 2021).

[65] It is important to note that we do not find any significant differences in how OBCs and upper caste Hindus behave.

[66] Please refer to Table D.6 in Appendix (D) for a statistical summary of these tests.

[67] Overall, these results remain consistent when we exclude OBC participants from the analysis, and look at donations made by upper caste Hindus towards Dalits and Brahmins. Results of a two-sided t-test are presented in Table D.7 in Appendix D.

When we consider the break-up in donations, we see that Dalit recipients on an average receive lesser dependence-oriented donations (M = 36, SD = 19.3, N = 30) as compared to Brahmins (M = 45.6, SD = 21.07, N = 33) in inclusive nationalism condition. This is marginally significant at 10% level (F statistic = 3.28; p-value = 0.071). To this end, there is a slight (non-significant) reduction in dependence-oriented donations (M = 36; SD = 19.3) towards Dalit recipients in inclusive nationalism condition, as compared to control (M = 41.3; SD = 17.21), and exclusive nationalism condition (M = 44.39; SD = 17.2). And in an increase in dependence-oriented donations towards Brahmin recipients (M = 45.6, SD = 21.07) in inclusive nationalism condition as compared to control (M = 41.7, SD = 17.8). Arguably, greater dependence-oriented donations towards Brahmin recipients, and lower donations towards Dalit recipients could be indicative of the prediction (2.2) of status threat hypotheses, where we had argued that salience of constitutional norms would increase gap in donations towards Brahmin and Dalit charity recipients. Though we had expected this to occur in empowerment-oriented domains; given the historical practice of giving alms to Dalits and thus maintaining status hierarchies,[68] rights-based narratives may be seen as a violation of traditional caste norms, which may, in turn, cue conflict motives,[69] and reduce dependence-oriented donations towards Dalits.

Analysing within-group allocations made to empowerment and dependence-oriented domains through paired t-tests we find that in the control condition, Dalit recipients on an average receive higher dependence-oriented donations (M= 41.34, SD = 17.21), than empowerment-oriented donations (M = 31.96, SD = 21.92)) significant at 5% level (t [2.05] p-value = 0.02, N = 35). This gap is relatively smaller in exclusive nationalism condition, where Dalit recipients on an average receive more dependence-oriented donations (M = 44.39, SD = 17.1) as compared to empowerment-oriented donations (M = 35.45, SD = 21.4) marginally significant at 10% level (t [1.692]; p-value = 0.0504, N = 20). In inclusive nationalism condition, the average donations to dependence (M = 36, SD = 19.3) and empowerment-oriented domains (M = 35.6, SD = 19.4) are nearly the same, and the difference is statistically insignificant (t[1.02], p-value = 0.31, N = 30).

[68] Phyllis J. Rolnick, 'Charity, trusteeship, and social change in India: A study of a political ideology,' *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1962): 439-460.

[69] Smriti Sharma, 'Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India,' *Journal of Comparative Economics*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2015): 204-226.

Given the inclination to provide more dependence-oriented help towards Dalit recipients, these results initially indicate that donations towards Dalits could be informed by status maintaining motives, and, hence, points us towards prediction (4.3) under social harmony hypotheses, wherein we had argued that salience of Hindutva norms would lead to higher dependence-oriented donations towards Dalit recipients. This is consonant with previous research, which shows that individuals may donate money to harmonise inequalities between groups as against challenging or alleviating them. However, these findings prove to be inconsistent when we remove OBC participants from our analysis. Due to space constraints, the details of this analysis are explained in Appendix E. Given this inconsistency, we are unable to draw upon any conclusive support for Social Harmony Hypotheses.

Similar to Dalits, Brahmins receive more dependence-oriented donations (M = 41.7, SD = 17.8) as compared to empowerment-oriented donations in the control condition (M = 36, SD = 15.98), with this difference being marginally significant at 10% level (t[1.34], p-value = 0.09, N = 35). Consistent with the control, in inclusive nationalism condition dependence-oriented donations (M = INR 45.6, SD = 36.6) remain higher than empowerment-oriented donations (M = INR 45.6, SD = 36.6), significant at 10 % level (p-value = 0.06, N = 30). Higher dependence-oriented donations towards Brahmin recipients could be indicative of heightened perception of group-based victimisation and status threat due to salience of equality and fairness-based norms.

We find no significant difference in these domains in exclusive nationalism condition (t[1.05]; p-value = 0.154, N = 30), with average donations at INR 44.52 (SD = 21.1) in dependence-oriented domain, and INR 38.58 (SD = 18.02) in empowerment-oriented domains. However, given the qualitative difference in donations in these domains, for future iterations of the present study, we hope to test whether Hindutva norms can motivate empowerment of Brahmin and Hindu poor, or maintain their status quo economic dependence. Importantly, we followed this up by excluding OBC participants from our analysis. We find consistently high donations towards dependence-oriented domains in inclusive nationalism condition. And higher dependence as against empowerment-oriented donations in Exclusive nationalism condition. The details of this analysis are presented in Appendix E.

27

## Polarising the minority and the disadvantaged: Gaps in donations received by Dalits and Muslim recipients

While, there is no statistically significant difference in donations made to Dalit (M = 73.25, SD = 29.9, N = 35) and Muslim recipients (M = 66.7, SD = 28.08, N = 30) in the control group (F stat = 0.89, p-value = 0.357), the difference in exclusive nationalism condition is larger and statistically significant at 1 % level (F stat = 9.98, p-value = 0.0018) with Muslim recipients on an average receiving INR 57.8 (SD = 38.69, N = 30), and Dalit recipients receiving INR 79.8 (SD = 25.1, N = 29). This gap is relatively smaller in inclusive nationalism condition, with Muslim recipients on average receiving INR 57.2 (SD = 29.9, N = 36) and Dalit recipients receiving INR 71.2 (SD = 26.3, N = 30), significant at 5 % level (F stat = 4.5, p-value = 0.037). Interestingly, in exclusive nationalism condition, there is an INR 6.2 increase in donations towards Dalit recipients, and INR 9.1 decrease in donations towards Muslim recipients (as compared to control). Only the latter is consistent in inclusive nationalism condition, with slight reduction in donations towards Muslims by INR 9.5. Considering donations in empowerment and dependence-oriented domains, Dalit recipients (M = 44.39, SD = 17.2) receive significantly higher donations (F stat = 11.07, p-value = 0.001) in dependence-oriented domains as compared to Muslim recipients (M = 26.9, SD = 21.5) in exclusive nationalism condition. And marginally higher donations in control condition (F stat = 3.17, p-value = 0.076) with Dalit and Muslim recipients on an average receiving INR 41.3 (SD = 17.21) and INR 32 (SD = 22.68), respectively. On the other hand, in inclusive nationalism condition the difference is not significant (F stat = 2.50, p-value = 0.1086), with average donations towards Dalit and Muslim recipients at INR 36 (SD = 19.3) and INR 27.7 (SD = 18.68) respectively. No significant difference was found in empowerment-oriented domains. When we remove OBC participants from this analysis we detect consist differences in donations towards Dalits and Muslims across treatment conditions. Due to space constraints, details of this analysis are presented in Appendix E.

Collectively, these results potentially indicate that the salience of Hindu nationalism can abet situational favouritism towards Dalits reflected by higher donations towards the dependence-oriented domain, and increase in hostility towards Muslims, reflected by the decrease in

dependence-oriented donations. This shows that common in-group identity associated with one group can increase prejudice towards another group. The salience of constitutional norms, on the other hand, tends to cue that status threat has a consistent, negative impact on dependence-oriented help provided to Muslims. Thus, it can be argued that the salience of Hindu nationalism can be instrumental in harmonising one set of group-based inequalities while simultaneously abetting another, and constitutional norms stay consistent in cueing status threat.

## **Regression specification: Causal effect of nationalism on donations towards Muslims and Dalits**

In the final step of the analysis, we study if total donations, dependence and empowerment-oriented donations made by the participants are systematically influenced by the social identity of the charity recipients and exposure to constitutional and Hindutva norms. To model these effects on participant donations, we use OLS regression to develop three independent models. The models are presented in Table 6. A detailed description of variables in the OLS models are presented in Table 5.

Keeping donations made to Brahmin recipients in the control condition as constant, controlling for caste, income, gender, and education, we find that exposure to constitutional norms as well as Hindutva norms reduces total donations, and dependence-oriented donations towards Muslim recipients, but not empowerment-oriented donations. That is, on an average, being exposed to constitutional norms reduces total donations towards Muslim recipients by 18.46 per cent (p-value = 0.008), and reduces dependence-oriented donations by 12.15 per cent (p-value = 0.013). Similarly, being exposed to Hindutva norms reduces total donations by 18.94 percent (p-value = 0.037), and dependence-oriented donations by 13.06 percent (p-value = 0.018). On the other hand, we find no significant discrimination towards Muslim recipients in the control condition. Overall, neither Hindutva, nor constitutional norms had any significant impact on donations towards Dalits and Brahmin recipients in empowerment and dependence-oriented domains. Consequently, it can be argued that the salience of both constitutional and Hindutva norms leads to decreased concern for needs of the Muslim poor among Hindu participants from Forward Caste, Brahmin and OBC background.

29

**Table 5: Description of Variables in Regression Specifications**

| Variable (Group) | Description |
|---|---|
| **Outcome Variables:** | |
| **Total Donations** | Total value in donations in the dictator game, can range from 0 to 100 |
| **Dependence Oriented Donations** | Total donations made in dependence-oriented domain, can range from 0 to 100 |
| **Empowerment Oriented Donations** | Total donations made in empowerment-oriented domain, can range from 0 to 100 |
| **Explanatory Variables:** | |
| **Inclusive Natioalism_Dalit** | Exposure to constitutional norms, and Dalit recipients. |
| **Inclusive Nationalism_Muslim** | Exposure to constitutional norms, and Muslim recipients |
| **Inclusive Nationalism_Brahmin** | Exposure to constitutional norms and Brahmin recipients |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Dalit** | Exposure to Hindutva Norms and Dalit recipients |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Muslim** | Exposure to Hindutva Norms and Muslim recipients |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Brahmin** | Exposure to Hindutva Norms and Brahmin recipients |
| **Control_Dalit** | Exposure to Dalit recipients |
| **Control_ Muslim** | Exposure to Muslim recipients |
| **Controls:** | |
| **Brahmin** | Takes the value 1 if Brahmin, 0 otherwise |
| **Forward Caste** | Takes the value 1 if Forward Caste, 0 otherwise |
| **Mid Income** | Takes the value 1 if the person earns annual income of between 2.5 to 5 lakhs per annum, 0 otherwise |
| **High income** | Takes the value 1 if the person earns annual income of above Rs 7.5 lakhs |
| **Vocational Education** | Takes the value 1 if completed Vocational Education, 0 otherwise |
| **Graduation** | Takes the value 1 if completed Graduation, 0 otherwise |
| **Post-Graduation** | Takes the value if completed Post Graduation, 0 otherwise |
| **Age** | Age in years |
| **Gender** | Takes the value 1 if female, 0 otherwise |
| **Constant:** | |
| **Control Brahmin** | Exposure to Brahmin Recipients in control condition |
| **Low Income** | Takes the value 1 if the person earns annual income of up to Rs 2.5 lakh per annum, 0 otherwise |
| **Low caste** | Takes the value 1 if OBC, SC, ST; 0 otherwise |
| **School Education** | Takes the value 1 if the person has attended school, 0 otherwise |

**Table 6: Linear Regression of the Impact of Nationalism on Total Donations, Dependence-oriented Donations, and Empowerment-oriented Donations**

| Variables | Model 1: Total Donations | Model 2: Dependence Oriented Donations | Model 3: Empowerment-Oriented Donations |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Inclusive Nationalism_Dalit Recipients** | -3.02 (6.75) | -4.34 (4.95) | 1.31 (4.65) |
| **Inclusive Nationalism_Muslim Recipients** | **-18.46 (6.92) \*\*\*** | **-12.15 (4.86)   \*\*** | -6.31 (4.045) |
| **Inclusive Nationalism_Brahmin Recipients** | 6.75 (6.05) | 5.83 (5.49) | .924 (4.43) |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Dalit Recipients** | 6.54 (6.34) | 4.89 (5.42) | 1.65 (4.49) |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Muslim Recipients** | **-18.94 (9.027)   \*\*** | **-13.06 (5.50)    \*\*\*** | -5.87 (5.24) |
| **Exclusive Nationalism_Brahmin Recipients** | 8.10 (6.87) | 4.88 (5.26) | 3.21 (4.30) |
| **Control_Dalit Recipients** | -2.42 (3.17) | 1.80 (5.34) | -4.23 (4.20) |
| **Control Muslim Recipients** | -10.945(.215) | -7.664 (5.74) | .8358185 (4.34) |
| **Middle Income (2.5 L to 7.5L)** | -.640 (4.10) | -4.99(3.14) | 4.50(2.61) |
| **High income (7.5L +)** | 4.10 (7.08) | -4.25 (4.29) | **9.10(4.57) \*\*** |
| **Gender** | -1.25 (3.17) | .807(2.32) | -.447 (2.049) |
| **Age** | .171 (.215) | .035(.148) | .035(.138) |
| **Brahmin** | -4.53 (3.61) | -4.53 (3.09) | **-7.34 (2.55) \*\*\*** |
| **Forward Caste** | -5.94 (4.68) | -5.94 (3.15) | **-6.48 (2.97) \*\*** |
| **Post-graduation** | 1.20 (5.57) | 1.91(4.51) | -.705(6.76) |
| **Graduation** | -4.87 (4.64) | -.187(3.35) | -4.69 (4.50) |
| **Vocational Education** | 2.45 (5.12) | 5.59 (3.76) | -3.13 (3.46) |
| **Constant** | 77.02 (10.46) | -10.95(8.17) | 37.81 (6.81) |
| **Number of Observations** | 276 | 276 | 276 |
| **R squared** | 0.136 | 0.163 | 0.094 |

*Note*: **\* Significant at 10% level, \*\* significant at 5% level, \*\*\* significant at 1% level (robust standard errors in parentheses).**

31

Interestingly, though, we did not find any significant impact of income, caste, education, age and gender in influencing dependence oriented or total donations, some of these factors are seen as significantly influencing empowerment-oriented donations. That is, based on the results of Model 3, income has a positive impact on empowerment-oriented donations – people from highest income background earning more than Rs 7.5 lakhs are likely to donate more (by 9.1%) to empower the poor, irrespective of the caste, or religious background of the poor recipient (p-value = 0.027). Caste has a negative impact on empowerment-oriented donations, such that compared to OBC participants, Forward Caste and Brahmin participants are less likely to contribute to empowerment-oriented domains – by 6.48% (p-value = 0.03) and 7.34% (p-value = 0.004) respectively.

## Conclusion:

The aim of the present research is to shed light on efficacy of charitable giving as a vehicle that can potentially serve to redistribute private capital to alleviate poverty among the marginalised groups in India. Placing individual decision making concerning prosocial behaviour in the context of rising nationalistic populism, we find that relying on charitable giving as a model of redistribution towards minorities and disadvantaged groups can perhaps serve to exacerbate existing inequalities among social groups in India. To this end, on an implementation front, NGOs such as Give India, HelpAge India, See India – have long used symbols of Indian national identity to motivate individuals to donate to charity. This symbolic marker of national identity is consonant with teeming social psychological evidence, which shows that common national identity carries the potential for motivating prosocial behaviour[70][71]. In India, as per data collected in 2012[72], a simple symbolic marker of Indian identity – a tricolour map – was enough to abet the prosocial

---

[70] Louis A. Penner, John F. Dovidio, Jane A. Piliavin, and David A. Schroeder, 'Prosocial behaviour: Multilevel Perspectives,' *Annu. Rev. Psychology*, vol. 56 (2005): 365-392.

[71] Vesa Peltokorpi, 'Host country national employees' prosocial behaviour toward expatriates in foreign subsidiaries: a common in-group identity model perspective,' *International Business Review*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2020): 101642.

[72] Volha Charnysh, Christopher Lucas, and Prerna Singh. 'The ties that bind: National identity salience and prosocial behaviour toward the ethnic other'(2015).

behaviour of upper-caste Hindus towards Muslims. However, as per the present study results, the solidarity embedded in the common Indian identity may be compromised.

It is yet reassuring to know that on a human level, without being sullied by the ideas of nationality or nationalism, a citizen in Lucknow feels solidarity with people outside of their religion and caste and is willing to help others out at a cost to themselves. Building on this knowledge, as researchers and practitioners dedicated to enhancing social and philanthropic impact, it is essential for us to systematically understand processes that thwart this inter-individual and inter-group concern and develop interventions to address the same.

While rebuilding inclusive nationalism is possibly not in our hands, as practitioners, we can yet work on solidifying cultural processes that lie at the cornerstone of the Indian Constitution – intergroup empathy, which seems to be preserved among the citizenry. That is, instead of fighting narrative wars, having quantified the role of the politics of nationalism in influencing individual-level prosocial behaviour (with perhaps longer-run and cumulative impact on structural inequalities), we urgently need to build social behavioural (as against political) interventions to preserve and strengthen inter-group cooperation, prosocial behaviour, and resource sharing. Lastly, acknowledging that behavioural interventions are indeed short-term low-cost plugs to a more systemic problem of resource distribution, we need to urgently advocate for, and implement (institutionally, if not nationally) redistributive social policies that can serve to empower those living at the bottom of the economic and social hierarchies.

# Bibliography

Abbink, Klaus, and Donna Harris, 'In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups,' *PloS one*, vol. 14, no. 9 (2019): e0221616.

Alvaredo, Facundo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. 2018b. World Inequality Report 2018. World Inequality Lab. http://wir2018.wid.world

Alvarez, Katherina, Esther van Leeuwen, Esteban Montenegro-Montenegro, and Mark van Vugt, 'Empowering the poor: A field study of the social psychological consequences of receiving autonomy or dependency aid in Panama,' *British Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 57, no. 2 (2018): 327-345.

Ambedkar, B.R. *Constitution of India*. Vol. 1, India: Ssoft Group, (2014).

Anderson, Edward, and Christophe Jaffrelot, 'Hindu nationalism and the "saffronisation of the public sphere": An interview with Christophe Jaffrelot,' *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 26, no. 4 (2018): 468-482.

Bajpai, Rochana. 'The conceptual vocabularies of secularism and minority rights in India,' *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002): 179-198.

Berry, C. J., 'Nations and norms', *The Review of Politics*, 43(1), (1981): 75-87.

Bettache, Karim, and Chi-Yue Chiu, 'The invisible hand is an ideology: Toward a social psychology of neoliberalism,' *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 75, no. 1 (2019): 8-19.

Bharti, Nitin Kumar. 'Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1961-2012.' *WID*. World Working Paper 14 (2018).

Brewer, Marilynn B., 'The psychology of prejudice: In-group love or out-group hate?, *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 55 (1999): 429-444.

Charnysh, Volha, Christopher Lucas, and Prerna Singh, 'The ties that bind: National identity salience and prosocial behaviour toward the ethnic other,' *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 48, no. 3 (2015): 267-300.

Chatterji, Angana P., Thomas Blom Hansen, and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. *Majoritarian state: How Hindu nationalism is changing India*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Chhibber, Pradeep K., and Rahul Verma. *Ideology and identity: The changing party systems of India*, New York: Oxford University Press, (2018).

Cikara, Mina, and Elizabeth Levy Paluck, 'When going along gets you nowhere and the upside of conflict behaviours,' *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, vol. 7, no. 8 (2013): 559-571.

Dardenne, B., Dumont, M., and Bollier, T., 'Insidious dangers of benevolent sexism: consequences for women's performance,' *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 93(5), (2007): 764.

Deshpande, Ashwini and Dean Spears, 'Who is the identifiable victim? Caste and charitable giving in modern India,' *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 64, no. 2 (2016): 299-321.

Dixon, John, Linda R. Tropp, Kevin Durrheim, and Colin Tredoux, '"Let them eat harmony" prejudice-reduction strategies and attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups,' *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2010): 76-80.

Dover, T.L., B. Major and C.R. Kaiser, 'Members of high-status groups are threatened by organisational diversity messages,' *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 62, (2016): 58–67.

Dovidio, J.F., S.L. Gaertner, N. Schnabel, T. Saguy and J. Johnson 'Recategorisation and prosocial behaviour,' *The Psychology of Prosocial Behaviour: Group Processes, Inter-group Relations, and helping*, (2010): 289-309.

Dovidio, John F., Samuel L. Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy, 'Another view of "we": Majority and minority group perspectives on a common in-group identity,' *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2008): 296-330.

Drèze, Jean. 'The Revolt of the upper castes,' *CASTE/A Global Journal on Social Exclusion*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2020): 229-236.

Fritsche, Immo, and Philipp Jugert, 'The consequences of economic threat for motivated social cognition and action,' *Current Opinion in Psychology*, vol. 18 (2017): 31-36.

Golwalkar, Madhav Sadashiv, 'Bunch of thoughts,' (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana 1996).

Halabi, Samer, and Arie Nadler, 'The inter-group status as helping relations model: Giving, seeking and receiving help as tools to maintain or challenge social inequality,' *Inter-group Helping* (Cham: Springer, 2017): 205-221.

Halabi, S., J.F. Dovidio and A. Nadler, 'When and how do high status group members offer help: Effects of social dominance orientation and status threat,' *Political Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 6, (2008): 841-858.

Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed., *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009).

Jaffrelot, Christophe, 'The fate of secularism in India,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2019a).

Jaffrelot, Christophe, 'Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election–Why Have So Many Poor Started Voting for Modi?' *Studies in Indian Politics*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019b): 149-160.

Jaffrelot, C., *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021).

Khan, Sammyh S., Ted Svensson, Yashpal A. Jogdand, and James H. Liu, 'Lessons from the past for the future: The definition and mobilisation of Hindu nationhood by the Hindu nationalist movement of India,' *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017): 477-511.

Kramer, RM and M.B. Brewer, 'Does a common in-group identity reduce inter-group threat?' *Group Processes & Inter-group Relations*, vol. 13, no. 4 (1984): 403–423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430209346701 last accessed on??

Krishnaswamy, Sudhir, *Democracy and Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Krosch, Amy R. and David M. Amodio, 'Economic scarcity alters the perception of race,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 111, no. 25 (2014): 9079-9084.

Layte, Richard, 'The association between income inequality and mental health: testing status anxiety, social capital, and neo-materialist explanations,' *European Sociological Review*, vol. 28, no. 4 (2012): 498-511.

Levendusky, Matthew S., 'Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarisation?' *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 80, no. 1 (2018): 59-70.

Lüders, Adrian, Eva Jonas, Immo Fritsche, and Dimitrij Agroskin, 'Between the lines of us and them: identity threat, anxious uncertainty, and reactive in-group affirmation: how can antisocial outcomes be prevented?' *Understanding peace and conflict through social identity theory*, (Cham: Springer, 2016): 33-53.

Lynch, John W., George Davey Smith, George A. Kaplan, and James S. House. 'Income inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions,' *Bmj*, vol. 320, no. 7243 (2000): 1200-1204.

Manstead, Antony SR, 'The psychology of social class: How socio-economic status impacts thought, feelings, and behaviour,' *British Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 57, no. 2 (2018): 267-291.

Merton, Robert King, and Robert C. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).

Michael A. Hogg, Scott A. Reid, 'Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms', *Communication Theory*, volume 16, no. 1, (February 2006): 7–30.

Mutz, Diana C., 'Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote,' *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330-E4339.

Nadler, A. 'Inter-group helping relations as power relations: Maintaining or challenging social dominance between groups through helping,' *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 58, no. 3, (2002): 487-502.

Nadler, Arie, Gal Harpaz-Gorodeisky, and Yael Ben-David, 'Defensive helping: Threat to group identity, in-group identification, status stability, and common group identity as determinants of inter-group help-giving,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 97, no. 5, (2009): 823.

Nadler, Arie, and Samer Halabi, 'Helping relations and inequality between individuals and groups,' *APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology,* Volume 2: Group processes, American Psychological Association, (2015): 371-393.

Pandey, Geeta, 'Uttar Pradesh Elecetions. We Muslims are treated like sacrificial goats.' BBC News, (12 April 2022), ttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60544034 Last accessed on: 15 June 2022

Patel, Vikram, Jonathan K. Burns, Monisha Dhingra, Leslie Tarver, Brandon A. Kohrt, and Crick Lund, 'Income inequality and depression: a systematic review and meta-analysis of the association and a scoping review of mechanisms,' *World Psychiatry*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2018): 76-89.

Peltokorpi, Vesa, 'Host country national employees' prosocial behaviour toward expatriates in foreign subsidiaries: a common in-group identity model perspective, *International Business Review*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2020): 101642.

Penner, Louis A., John F. Dovidio, Jane A. Piliavin, and David A. Schroeder, 'Prosocial behaviour: Multilevel perspectives,' *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, vol. 56 (2005): 365-392.

Ribeiro, Wagner Silva, Annette Bauer, Mário César Rezende Andrade, Marianna York-Smith, Pedro Mario Pan, Luca Pingani, Martin Knapp, Evandro Silva Freire Coutinho, and Sara Evans-Lacko, 'Income inequality and mental illness-related morbidity and resilience: a systematic review and meta-analysis,' *The Lancet Psychiatry*, vol. 4, no. 7 (2017): 554-562.

Ridley, Matthew, Gautam Rao, Frank Schilbach, and Vikram Patel, 'Poverty, depression, and anxiety: Causal evidence and mechanisms,' *Science*, vol. 370, no. 6522 (2020): easy 0214.

Rolnick, Phyllis J., 'Charity, trusteeship, and social change in India: A study of a political ideology,' *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1962): 439-460.

Sai Deepak J., *India that is Bharat: Coloniality, Civilisation, Constitution*, USA: Bloomsbury (2021).

Scheepers, D., N. Ellemers, and N. Sintemaartensdijk, 'Suffering from the possibility of status loss: Physiological indicators of social identity threat in high status groups', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 39, (2009): 1075–1092.

Scheepers, D., C. Röell, and N. Ellemers, 'Unstable power threatens the powerful and challenges the powerless: Evidence from cardiovascular markers of motivation', *Frontiers in Psychology*, vol. 6, (2015): 720

Scroll Staff, 'Karnataka: Student wearing Hijab heckled, allegedly by ABVP members' Scroll, 12 April 2022, https://scroll.in/latest/1018793/karnataka-student-wearing-hijab-heckled-allegedly-by-abvp-members Last accessed on: 15 June 2022

Shah, Alpa, Jens Lerche, Richard Axelby, Dalel Benbabaali, Brendan Donegan, Raj Jayaseelan, and Thakur Vikramditya, 'Ground down by growth: tribe, caste, class and inequality in 21st Century India', London: *Pluto Press*, (2017).

Sharma, Smriti, 'Caste-based crimes and economic status: Evidence from India,' *Journal of Comparative Economics*, vol. 43, no. 1, (2015): 204-226.

Tharoor, Shashi, 'Who is an Indian?' *SAIS Review, (1989-2003)*, (2000): 103105.

Tharoor, Shashi, 'The Battle of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism and what it means to be Indian,' Kindle: Aleph Book Company, (2020).

Ufkes, Elze G., Justine Calcagno, Demis E. Glasford, and John F. Dovidio, 'Understanding how common in-group identity undermines collective action among disadvantaged-group members,' *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 63 (2016): 26-35.

**Appendix A**

**List of recruitment areas in Lucknow:**

1. Alambagh
2. Aliganj
3. Aminabad
4. Balaganj
5. Budheshwar
6. Chandganj
7. Chhowk
8. Dalganj
9. Ganeshganj
10. Gayatri Puram
11. Gomti Nagar
12. Hazratganj
13. Indira Nagar
14. Jankipuram
15. Krishna Nagar
16. LDA colony
17. Mawaiya
18. Moti Nagar
19. Moti Jheel
20. Nishat Ganj
21. Rajoi Puram
22. Shukla Chauraha
23. Thakurganj
24. Triveni Nagar
25. Vikas Nagar

**Appendix B**

**Inclusive historical social norm: The Constitution of India**



बनारस हिंदू अशोक तथा संविधान विश्वविद्यालय जैसे **महान विश्वविद्यालय** के **शोध** में पाया गया है कि **ऐतिहासिक रूप से** कई **महान हिंदुस्तानियो** का मानना है कि "**सच्चे हिंदुस्तानी**" होने के लिए, **सहनशीलता** महत्वपूर्ण हैं। सभी **धर्मों, जातियों और जनजातियों** का **सम्मान** करना भी महत्वपूर्ण हैं।अधिकांश हिंदुस्तानी ये भी मानते आये हैं की **हिंदुस्तानियो** को संविधान में लिखे **मूल्य: समानता, न्याय और बंधुत्व** एवम, हर **जाति और धर्म** के **मौलिक अधिकारों** के प्रति प्रतिबद्ध रहना। ऐतिहासिक रूप से **सच्चे हिंदुस्तानी इन मूल्यों का उल्लंघन नहीं करते।**

समानता    न्याय    बंधुत्व

**Translation:**

Research by great universities such as the Banaras Hindu, Ashoka and The Constitution University has found that historically many great Indians have believed that in order to be a 'true Hindustani', tolerance is important. It is also important to respect all religions, castes and tribes. Most Indians have also believed that Indians should be committed to the values written in the constitution: equality, justice and fraternity and fundamental rights of every caste and religion. Historically, true Indians do not violate these norms.

**Figure. 2: Exclusive historical social norm: Hindutva**



बनारस हिंदू अशोक तथा संविधान विश्वविद्यालय जैसे महान विश्वविद्यालय के शोध में पाया गया है कि ऐतिहासिक रूप से कई महान भारतीयों का मानना है कि "सच्चे भारतीय" होने के लिए, हिन्दू धर्म से जुड़े रहना महत्वपूर्ण हैं। हिंदू एकता, हिंदू संस्कृति, हिंदू जागृति, का सम्मान करना भी महत्वपूर्ण हैं।अधिकांश भारतीय ये भी मानते हैं की भारतीयों को 10,000 साल पुरानी हिंदू संस्कृति, एवम शास्त्रों में लिखा हुए ज्ञान के प्रति प्रतिबद्ध रहना चाहिए। ऐतिहासिक रूप से सच्चे भारतीय इन मूल्यों का उल्लंघन नहीं करते।

हिंदू संस्कृति     हिंदू जागृति     हिंदू एकता

**Translation:**

Research by great universities such as the Banaras Hindu, Ashoka and The Constitution University has found that historically many great Indians believed that in order to be a 'true Indian', it is important to stick to Hinduism. It is also important to respect Hindu unity, Hindu culture, and Hindu awakening. Most Indians also believe that Indians should remain committed to the 10,000-year-old Hindu culture and the wisdom written in the scriptures. Historically, true Indians do not violate these norms.

41

**Appendix C**

**C.1 Introduction to the decision task - inclusive nationalism condition:**

निर्देश:

अब हम आपसे एक संक्षिप्त निर्णय कार्य में भाग लेने का अनुरोध करते हैं। यह निर्णय लेने में आपको दो लोगों के साथ जोड़ा जाएगा: यह निर्णय लेने में आपको दो लोगों के साथ जोड़ा जाएगा: नथु वाल्मीकी और विकास चमार । कृपया उनके बारे में नीचे विस्तार से पढ़ें।

नथु वाल्मीकी को रोशन फाउंडेशन का और विकास चमार को इंडस एक्शन का समर्थन मिल रहा है।

आपके निर्णय के आधार पर आपको एक और भुगतान प्राप्त हो सकता है जो सर्वेक्षण के लिए आपके प्रारंभिक भुगतान में जोड़ा जाएगा।

**2.2) Introduction to the decision task - exclusive nationalism condition:**

निर्देश:

अब हम आपसे एक संक्षिप्त निर्णय कार्य में भाग लेने का अनुरोध करते हैं। यह निर्णय लेने में आपको दो लोगों के साथ जोड़ा जाएगा: यह निर्णय लेने में आपको दो लोगों के साथ जोड़ा जाएगा: नथु वाल्मीकी और विकास चमार । कृपया उनके बारे में नीचे विस्तार से पढ़ें।

नथु वाल्मीकी को रोशन फाउंडेशन का और विकास चमार को इंडस एक्शन का समर्थन मिल रहा है।

आपके निर्णय के आधार पर आपको एक और भुगतान प्राप्त हो सकता है जो सर्वेक्षण के लिए आपके प्रारंभिक भुगतान में जोड़ा जाएगा।

**Translation:**

Instructions: We now request you to participate in a brief decision task. You will be paired with two people in making this decision: Nathu Valmiki and Vikas Chamar. Please read about them in detail below.

Nathu Valmiki is supported by Roshan Foundation and Vikas Chamar is supported by Indus Action.

Based on your decision you may receive another payment which will be added to your initial payment for the survey.

**C.2) Charity recipients:**

The descriptions of the recipients were the same across treatment groups, only names and the geographic location of the recipients changed to indicate recipient's social identity.

**Recipient 1:**

**विकास चमार और उनका परिवार:** विकास चमार और उनकी पत्नी बिरजीत चमार, उनके बच्चे अंबेडकर नगर में प्राथमिक विद्यालय जाते हैं, वे बिरजीत चमार के बुजुर्ग माता-पिता के साथ रहते हैं, जो अपनी बेटी और दामाद पर निर्भर हैं।

**काम:** हरियाणा के सोनीपत में एक स्टील फैक्ट्री में सफाईकर्मी हैं, जहां वे फैक्ट्री के कर्मचारियों के लिए बाड़ों में रहते हैं। काम की खराब परिस्थितियों के कारण विकास चमार की पत्नी बिरजीत अक्सर बीमार पड़ जाती हैं. और उनकी सामूहिक आय प्रभावित होती है।

**आय:** वे एक साल में 70,000 रुपये से 90,000 रुपये के बीच कमाते हैं।

**चैरिटी, इंडस एक्शन संगठन** विकास चमार और बिरजीत चमार जैसे गरीब दलित लोगों को हर महीने नकद हस्तांतरण प्रदान करके उनकी मदद कर रहा है । नकद प्राप्त करके रमेश और बिरजीत चमार, भोजन, शिक्षा और अपने परिवार की अन्य जरूरतों पर नकद खर्च करने का निर्णय ले सकते हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त, इंडस एक्शन विकास चमार और उनकी पत्नी बिरजीत चमार जैसे दलितों को वयस्क शिक्षा प्रदान करके उन्हें सशक्त बना रहा है। और उन्हें उनके अधिकारों के बारे में जागरूक कर रहा है।

This description was followed by an 'attention check' question to ensure that participants read the description.

**Translation:**

**Vikas Chamar and his family:** Vikas Chamar and his wife Birjit Chamar, their children attend primary school in Ambedkar Nagar, live with the elderly parents of Birjit Chamar, who are dependent on their daughter and son-in-law.

**Work:** There are scavengers at a steel factory in Sonipat, Haryana, where they live in enclosures for factory workers. Vikas Chamar's wife Birjit often falls ill due to poor working conditions. And their collective income is affected.

**Income:** They earn between INR 70,000 to 90,000 a year.

**The charity, Indus Action Sangathan** is helping poor Dalit people like Vikas Chamar and Birjit Chamar by providing them cash transfers every month. Receiving cash, Ramesh and Birjit Chamar can decide to spend cash on food, education and other needs of their family. Additionally, Indus Action is empowering Dalits like Vikas Chamar and his wife Birjit Chamar by providing adult education to them, and making them aware of their rights.

**Dalit Recipients**: Vikas Chamar and Birjit Chamar of Ambedkar Nagar
**Muslim Recipients:** Irman Kasim and Bano Kasim of Muzaffar Nagar
**Hindu Recipients**: Himanshu and Komal Mishra of Ayodhya

**Recipient 2**

नथु वाल्मीकी और उनका परिवार: नथु वाल्मीकी उसकी पत्नी और जेवंती वाल्मीकी उनके 6, और 8 वर्ष के बच्चे , बुजुर्ग पिता 65 वर्ष और माता 63 वर्ष की, हरिजन बस्ती की एक झुगी में रहते हैं ।

काम: नथु वाल्मीकी कारखाना निर्माण स्थल पर मजदूरी का काम करता है। फैक्ट्री के पास हरिजन बस्ती में खराब साफ-सफाई के कारण वह अक्सर बीमार पड़ जाता है, जिससे उसकी काम करने की क्षमता पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव पड़ता है। उसकी पत्नी जेवंती वाल्मीकी पास की फैक्ट्री में सफाई का काम करती है।

आय: सामूहिक रूप से, वे प्रति वर्ष 70,000 से 90,000 रुपये के बीच कमाते हैं।

चैरिटी, रोशन फाउंडेशन: नथु वाल्मीकी के परिवार जैसे गरीब हरिजन लोगों को हर महीने भोजन वाउचर प्रदान करके उनकी मदद कर रहा है, ताकि वे अपने परिवार की भोजन और पोषण संबंधी जरूरतों को पूरा कर सकें। इसके अतिरिक्त, रोशन फाउंडेशन इन गरीब हरिजनों को कपड़े और अन्य उपयोग किए गए घरेलू सामान दान में देता है ।

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

**Translation:**

**Nathu Valmiki and his family:** Nathu Valmiki his wife and Jevanti Valmiki their children 6, and 8 years old, father 65 years old and mother 63 years, live in a slum in Harijan Basti.

**Work:** Nathu Valmiki works as a labourer at the factory construction site. He often falls ill due to poor sanitation in Harijan Basti near the factory, which adversely affects his ability to work. His wife Jevanti Valmiki works as a cleaner in a nearby factory.

**Income:** Collectively, they earn between INR 70,000 to 90,000 per year.

**Charity, Roshan Foundation:** Helping poor Harijans like Nathu Valmiki's family by providing them food vouchers every month, so that they can meet their family's food and nutritional needs. In addition, Roshan Foundation donates clothes and other household items to these poor Harijans.


**Dalit Recipients:** Nathu Valmiki and Jevanti Valmiki, Harijan Basti

**Muslim Recipients:** Salim Mohammad and Salma Mohammad, Muslim Basti

**Hindu Recipients:** Himanshu Jha and Renu Jha, Basti in Varanasi

**C.3) Instructions to dictator game:**

**Inclusive nationalism:**



अब निर्णय कार्य:
कृपया इस **निर्णय कार्य के निर्देशों** को ध्यान से पढ़ें:

**Exclusive nationalism:**



अब निर्णय कार्य:
कृपया इस **निर्णय कार्य के निर्देशों** को ध्यान से पढ़ें:

**Translation:** Now decision task: please read the instructions of the tasks carefully.

**C.4) Dictator game:**

(The colour in which the game was presented changed as per the treatment condition; below is the game as presented in the control group).

हम आपको इस अध्यन में भाग लेने के लिए 100 रुपये का बोनस दे रहे है।

आपका काम 100 रुपये को अपने, रोशन फाउंडेशन यानि की नथु वाल्मीकी, और इंडस एक्शन संगठन यानि की विकास चमार के बीच बांटना है। आप पैसे का आवंटन कैसे करते हैं यह पूरी तरह से आपका निर्णय है। कृपया नीचे बताएं कि आप धन को कैसे विभाजित करेंगे, आप जो कुछ भी विभाजित नहीं करते हैं वह घर ले जाने के लिए आपका है। इस प्रकार यदि आप कुछ नहीं देते हैं तो आपको 100 मिलते हैं और यदि आप सब कुछ देते हैं तो आपको 0 मिलता है। 0 और 100 के बीच की पूरी रेंज आपके लिए खुली है।

अगर आप रोशन फाउंडेशन को देंगे तो पैसा नथु वाल्मीकी, उनकी पत्नी को जाएगा। और अगर आप इंडस एक्शन संगठन को देते हैं, तो वह विकास चमार और उनकी पत्नी को जाएगा।

**Translation:** We are giving you a bonus of INR 100 for participating in this study.

Your task is to distribute INR 100 among yourself, Roshan Foundation that is, Nathu Valmiki, and Indus Action Organisation that is, Vikas Chamar. How you allocate the money is entirely your decision. Please explain below how you will split the money, anything you don't split is yours to take home. Thus, if you give nothing you get 100 and if you give everything you get 0. The entire range between 0 and 100 is open to you.

If you give to Roshan Foundation, the money will go to Nathu Valmiki, his wife. And if you give to Indus Action organisation, it will go to Vikas Chamar and his wife.

**6) Decision matrix for the dictator game:**

---

## कृपया हमें नीचे बताएं कि आप 100 रुपये को कैसे विभाजित करेंगे।

| | |
|---|---|
| मैं नथु वाल्मीकी जैसे गरीब हरिजन लोगों के खाने के वाउचर, और घर के अन्य सामान के लिए रोशन फाउंडेशन को १०० रुपए में से (रिक्त स्थान) में बताये गए पैसे दूंगा/ दूँगी | 0 |
| मैं विकास चमार जैसे दलितों के कॅश वाउचर, प्रौढ़ शिक्षा, अधिकार जागरूकता और अधिकारिता के लिए इंडस एक्शन को 100 रुपए में से (रिक्त स्थान) में बताये गए पैसे दूंगा/ दूँगी | 0 |
| 100 रूपए में से, मैं (रिक्त स्थान) में बताये गए पैसे रखूंगा/रखूंगी | 0 |
| Total | 0 |

**Translation:**

Please tell us how you would divide INR 100 among different recipients:

Out of INR 100, I will give the amount indicated in the blank space to Roshan Foundation for food vouchers and other needs of poor Harijans like Nathu Valmiki:

Out of INR 100, I will give the amount indicated in the blank space to Indus Action for cash transfers, adult and rights education of poor Dalits like Vikas Chamar:

Out of INR 100, I will keep the amount indicated in the blank space for myself:

**Table D.2: Difference in donations to Dalit, Muslim and Brahmin recipients across treatment and control conditions**

|  | Inclusive – Control | Exclusive - Control | Inclusive - Exclusive |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Muslim** | 1.90 (p-value = 0.1687) | 1.59 (p - value = 0.2089) | 0.00 (p- value = 0.9580) |
| **Dalit** | 1.37 (p - value = 0.2424) | 0.91 (p - value = 0.3421) | 0.05 (p-value = 0.8152) |
| **Brahmin** | 0.54 (p - value = 0.592) | 0.802 (p-value = 0.4321) | 0.1196 (p-value = 0.906) |

**Table D.4: Difference in donations made to Brahmins and Muslims by upper caste participants**

| Recipient Identity | Inclusive Nationalism | Exclusive Nationalism | Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Brahmin** | 53.1 (31.72) | 53.2 (39.15) | 66.85 (32.4) |
| **Muslim** | 78.6 (22.03) | 86.4 (18.9) | 76.49 (27.6) |
| **Difference (t test)** | t = 2.83 (p = 0.0018) | t = 3.27 (p = 0.0005) | t = 0.293 (p = 0.79) |

**Table D.5: Within group differences in donations towards Muslim charity recipients**

| Treatment Condition | Mean Dependence oriented Giving | Mean Empowerment-oriented Giving | Difference, paired t test |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inclusive Nationalism N = 34 | 27.7 (18.68) | 29.4 (16.5) | t= -0.518 (p-value = 0.6964) |
| Exclusive Nationalism N = 29 | 26.9 (21.5) | 30.6 (21.07) | t= -1.1694 (p-value = 0.8694) |
| Control N = 30 | 32 (22.68) | 34.667 (17.71) | t = 1.5580 (p-value =0.642) |

**Table D.6: Wald test of difference in donations towards Dalit and Brahmin recipients (combined sample)**

| | Total Donations | Dependence Oriented Donations | Empowerment-Oriented Donations |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Control** | Difference = Rs 4.5 F = 0.42 (p =0.5612) | F = 0.01 (p = 0.9416) | F = 0.81 (p = 0.365) |
| **Inclusive Nationalism** | Difference = Rs 11.7 F = 2.33 (p = -.1368) | F = 3.28 (p = 0.071) * | F = 0.04 (p = 0.835) |
| **Exclusive Nationalism** | Difference = INR 2.3 F = 0.23 (p = 0.6293) | F = 0.00 (p = 0.9786) | F = 0.49 (p = 0.480) |

**Table D.7: T-test of difference in donations towards Dalits and Brahmins by upper caste Hindu participants**

|  | Total Donations | Empowerment- oriented Domain | Dependence Oriented Domain |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Inclusive Nationalism** | t = 1.093<br>P-value = 0.2816 | t = 1.16825.<br>he *p*-value = 0.250387. | t = - 1.932<br>p- value = 0.06324 |
| **Exclusive Nationalism** | t = 0.8671<br>P-value = 0.3916 | t = 0.24625.<br>*p*-value = .806847. | t = 1.08701.<br>*p*-value = .284063 |
| **Control** | t = 0.0185<br>P-value = 0.9853 | t = -1.63908.<br>The *p*-value = .108667 | t = 0.69429.<br>p-value = .491326. |

## Appendix E

### 1) Accounting for Heterogeneity in Sample Characteristics

While exogenously, the analysis attempts to test the impact of nationalism and social identity of the charity recipients on charitable donations, in keeping with principles of participant anonymity, in an attempt to prevent priming participant social identity in the recruitment process and, thus, purposive bias in selection, we had chosen to select participants pre-registered as Hindus and upper caste; however, this pre-selection could not prevent recruitment of OBC and SC participants within the sample.

To account for the impact of heterogeneity in participant caste identity in the sample on our results, we first attempted to descriptively understand the distribution of caste across treatment conditions. The sample is constitutive of nearly 106 Brahmin, 69 Forward Caste, 89 Other Backward Caste, and 17 Scheduled Caste, and 2 Schedule Tribe participants. Based on the break-up of these descriptive statistics across treatment conditions, presented in Table 1, we can see that this amounted to an average of 11 Brahmins, 7 FCs, 10 OBCS, and 1 SC per treatment[73]. To check for the moderating effect of the social identity of the participant on donations across treatment conditions, we control for caste in the regression analysis presented in Table (6). This, in turn, allows us to identify any preliminary evidence for heterogenous treatment effects.

However, given that we have small sample sizes and we are interested in identifying treatment effects, when considering donations towards Dalit charity recipients, we removed Scheduled Caste participants from the analysis. This amounted to removing one observation from T1 and T4 each and three observations from C1. On the other hand, given that previous research on nationalism and prosocial behaviour indeed documents discrimination of scheduled caste groups towards Muslims, we considered it analytically consistent to keep observations from Scheduled Caste

---

[73] **Range of distribution of caste identity per treatment were as follows:** Brahmins (7 to 20), Forward Castes: (7 to 13), OBC: (7 to 12), SC: (1 to 5).

participants, amounting to one observation each in T2 and T5, and five observations in C2 within the analysis.

There is yet limited research on how participants from OBC background as against upper-caste Hindu background may respond differentially to Hindutva and constitutional discourse and how these two groups may behave towards distinct out-groups that is, Dalits, Muslims and Brahmins. Upper-caste participants (combining Brahmins and Forward Castes) on an average accounted for 18 participants per treatment, and OBC participants accounted for an average of 10 participants per treatment. Following from this, as a starting point, we analysed if OBCs behaved differently from Brahmins and Forward Castes across treatment conditions towards the three groups. A break-up of donations made by participants from Brahmin, Forward Caste and OBC backgrounds, and a t-test of their difference is presented in Table E.1[74]. In inclusive nationalism condition, donations by OBC participants to Dalits (M = 90, SD = 23.607) were marginally higher (t [1.98] p-value = 0.06),as compared to Brahmins (M = 70.672 , SD = 19.76) and significantly higher at 5% level (t[2.31] p-value = 0.036) as compared to Forward Castes (M = 63.3, SD = 23.5).[75] We did not detect any statistically significant differences in donations by OBC, Forward Caste and Brahmin participants across any other treatment conditions. Following this, we excluded OBC and SC observations from our analysis, and ran a t-test to preliminarily understand the effect of caste status on donations to Dalit recipients across treatment conditions. This analysis showed no significant effect. This result is presented in Table E.3. It is important to note that given the small sample size, we cannot yet consider these differences to be conclusive, however, for the purpose of the present research we consider these results as informative in guiding our empirical analytic strategy. To remain sensitive to any differences, for the purpose of the present pilot, we stratify our analysis by the social identity of the participant when discussing results pertaining to different charity recipients and later control for these attributes in the regression analysis.

---

[74]Given that we have 17 SC observations, which amounted to an average of 2 observations per treatment condition– it wasn't feasible to conduct a similar test for SCs– rather we tested is removing SCs from the analysis made any difference in the overall results of the study. And controlled for Caste in the regression analysis.

[75] Number of observations per group are as follows: OBC (7), Forward Caste (13), Brahmin (9).

**Table E.1: T test of difference in donations made by upper caste groups (Brahmin and Forward Caste) and OBC across treatment conditions**

| Treatment Condition | Brahmin | Forward Caste | OBC | Difference in Donations between Forward Caste and OBC | Difference in Donations between Brahmins and OBC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **T1: Inclusive Dalit** | 63.33<br>[23.45]<br>(n = 9) | 70.76200<br>[19.76000]<br>(n = 13) | 90<br>[22.3606]<br>(n = 7) | t = 1.9860<br>{p = 0.0625} | t = 2.31<br>{p = 0.036} |
| **T2: Inclusive-Muslim** | 55.71<br>[30.87]<br>(n = 14) | 52.5000<br>[19.7600]<br>(n = 8) | 64.545<br>[ 28.32]<br>(n = 11) | t = 0.2797<br>{p = 0.7867} | t = 1.4723<br>{p = 0.147} |
| **T3: Inclusive Brahmin** | 78.92000<br>[21.13000]<br>(n=14) | 76.6666<br>[32.14]<br>(n = 7) | 87.22200<br>[12.52000]<br>(n = 9) | t = 1.2149<br>{p=0.2410} | t = 1.0599<br>{p =0.302} |
| **T4: Exclusive Dalit** | 79<br>[30.14]<br>(n = 10) | 82.2<br>[15.6]<br>(n=9) | 79.166<br>[29.991]<br>(n = 12) | t = 0.2785<br>{p =0.7836} | t = 0.4064<br>{p = 0.6895} |
| **T5: Exclusive Muslim** | 57.1400<br>[27.0400]<br>(n =7) | 46.25<br>[49.03]<br>(n = 8) | 64.1600<br>40.4900<br>11.6885<br>(n = 12) | t = 0.8853<br>{p = 0.387} | t = 1.1134<br>{p = 0.276} |
| **T6: Exclusive Brahmin** | 87.50000<br>[19.59000]<br>(n = 12) | 90<br> [12.6491<br> (n = 6) | 77.57000<br>[6.67672]<br>(n = 14) | t = 1.1448<br>{p = 0.2673} | t = 1.1134<br>{p =0.276} |
| **C1: Control Dalit** | 76.81000<br>[31.05000]<br>(n = 11) | 68<br>[38.98]<br>(n = 5) | 73.72700<br>[19.29400]<br>(n = 11) | t = 0.4020<br>{p = 0.6938} | t = 0.2797<br>{p = 0.7826} |
| **C2: Control Muslim** | 68.3<br>Sd = 33.91<br>(n = 9) | 64.4400<br>[34.6800]<br>(n = 9) | 60<br>Sd =21.9089<br>(n = 6) | t = 0.2771<br>{p = 0.7861} | t = 0.5272<br>{p = 0.609} |
| **C3: Control Brahmin** | 76.250000<br>30.380000<br>(n = 20) | 77.14<br>19.66<br>7 | 79.280000<br>20.499100<br>7 | t = 0.1330<br>{p = 0.8952} | t = 0.2436<br>{p = 0.8095} |

**Table E.3: Difference in donations allocated to Dalits across inclusive and exclusive nationalism conditions, and control by upper caste Hindu participants (*removing OBC, and SC participants from the analysis)**

| Inclusive versus Exclusive | Exclusive versus Control | Inclusive versus Control |
|---|---|---|
| t = 0.837 | t = 0.2490 | t = 0.5664 |
| P-value = 0.4166 | P-value = 0.8051 | P-value = 0.5572 |

## 2) Dependence and Empowerment Oriented Donations towards Dalits among Upper Caste Hindus after removing OBC sub-sample

However, when we exclude OBC observations from the analysis, we do not find consistent results. A paired t-test shows that Dalits receive more dependence (M = 44.35, SD = 27.7) as against empowerment-oriented help (M = 27.81, SD = 18.616) in the control condition marginally significant at 10% level (t[1.97];p-value = 0.056, N = 16); in the exclusive conditions this gap decreases and becomes statistically insignificant (t[1.12], p-value = 0.26, N = 19). Interestingly, the amount of dependence-oriented donations remains the same across control (M = 44.35. SD = 27.7) and exclusive nationalism condition (M = 43.25, SD = 19.81); rather empowerment-oriented donations increase (M = 37, SD = 15.84) in exclusive nationalism condition as compared to control by INR 10. Relative to exclusive nationalism condition, in inclusive nationalism condition, Dalits receive relatively lower (though not significantly lower) dependence (M = 38.09, SD = 18.53) and empowerment-oriented donations (M = 32.85. SD = 14.19); the gap between the donations allocated to the domains is statistically insignificant (t = 1.02, p-value = 0.310, N = 21). However, it is important to note that the sample size reduces by 1/3rd when we exclude OBC observations, and, therefore, the power with which we can report these results reduces as well. A preliminary

55

conclusion from this analysis could be that Hindu nationalism indeed motivates upper caste Hindus to donate towards Dalit empowerment; this is diametrically opposite to our hypotheses, and the argument laid out above. Given the contradictory and inconsistent patterns in these results, we cannot reject or accept prediction (4.3) under social harmony hypotheses.

### 3) Empowerment and Dependence Oriented Donations towards Brahmins among upper Caste Hindus after removing OBC sub-samples

When we exclude observations from OBC participants, we do not detect consistent results. Rather, we find no significant difference in empowerment (M = 39.69, SD = 16.1) and dependence-oriented (M = 36.82, SD = 15.13) donations in the control group (t [0.65], p-value = 0.516, N = 27). We find higher dependence (M = Rs 44.52, SD = 21.1) as against empowerment- oriented donations (M = 38.58; SD = 18.02, N = 18) in exclusive nationalism condition, significant at 5% level (t [2.312]; p-value = 0.026, N = 21). And consistently high dependence (M = 45.6, SD = 21.07), over empowerment-oriented donations (M = 36.6, SD = 18.002) in inclusive nationalism condition, significant at 1% level (t[3.42], p-value = 0.0016). Since we have very few OBC participants, it is not possible for us to draw any conclusive results about their behaviour across treatment conditions.

### 4) Comparison of Donations towards Dalits and Muslims among upper caste Hindus after removing OBC sub-samples

When we remove OBC observations from this analysis we find that Dalit recipients (M = 81.25, SD = 19.81, N = 19) receive significantly higher donations as compared to Muslim recipients (M = 53.2, SD = 39.15, N = 15) in exclusive nationalism condition (t[3.110], p-value = 0.0038). This difference is smaller, but statistically significant in inclusive nationalism condition (t[2.203] p-value = 0.03) with Dalits and Muslims on an average receiving INR 70.06 (SD = 18.53, N = 21) and INR 53.1 (SD =31.72, N = 22), respectively. In the control condition, there is no significant gap in donations, with Dalits and Muslims receiving INR 72.15 (SD = 33.11, N = 27) and INR 66.85 (SD = 32.4, N = 18) respectively (t[0.326], p-value = 0.746). When we look at the break-up of donations, we find that Dalits receive higher dependence-oriented donations (M = 38.09, SD =

18.53) compared to Muslims (M = 24.34, SD = 17.9) in inclusive nationalism condition (t[2.2], p-value = 0.03). And significantly higher donations (t(2.6) p-value = 0.013) in exclusive nationalism condition, with Dalits and Muslims receiving INR 43.25 (SD = 19.81) and INR 25.31 (SD = 21.9) respectively. In the control condition, again, there is no significant difference (t[1.006] p-value = 0.29) in dependence-oriented donations received by Dalits and Muslim recipients, and no significant difference is found in empowerment-oriented donations across treatment and control conditions. A closer look at descriptive statistics shows that the difference between Dalit and Muslim recipients is higher in exclusive nationalism condition, as compared to inclusive nationalism condition, and is largely accounted for by higher dependence-oriented donations towards Dalit recipients in exclusive nationalism condition, as the donations towards Muslim recipients remains more or less constant across treatment conditions.